Continue from Resume →
The Theater Papers · No. 12

No Off Switch

A Map of the Sanctions-Proof Network

Akshay Shrestha

A long-form essay. Reading time: about 15 minutes.


No Off Switch: A Map of the Sanctions-Proof Network
The Theater Papers, No. 12

Copyright © 2026 Akshay Shrestha. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form without the prior written permission of the author, except for brief quotations in reviews and commentary.

This essay adapts and dramatizes arguments made in one public commentary by the historian Vladimir Brovkin on his history and politics channel, following the BRICS summit in New Delhi in September 2026. It reports and dramatizes the positions he stated on the record, including his account of how the BRICS payment system is built, and presents them as one interpretive map: commentary and opinion, not medical, legal, or financial advice, and not investment guidance. Where the essay reports a claim, attribution of the claim is intended, not endorsement. Predictions are staked precisely so that they can fail in public.

First edition, 2026.

"The dollar is our currency, but it's your problem."

John Connally, United States Treasury Secretary, to European finance ministers, 1971

1The Bloc That Was Dying

At the beginning of 2026, nearly everyone who watched BRICS for a living agreed that it was dying. Western observers said so, and so did plenty of observers who were not Western at all. The bloc of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, enlarged in 2024 and 2025 to take in Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia, was ineffective, it was coming apart, and it was finished. The reason, more than any other, was India. India had never sat easily inside a club led by China and Russia. It has a long rivalry with China and a Himalayan border dispute that turns violent from time to time, as it did in the deadly clashes of 2020. With Pakistan its relationship is closer to a state of war than to a rivalry, and Pakistan, on Vladimir Brovkin's account, was about to take the chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, one of the main instruments of economic coordination in Asia. New Delhi did not take that well.

Then, in February 2026, Prime Minister Narendra Modi flew to Israel and addressed the Knesset. Contracts were signed, military ones among them. There was a warm exchange with Vice President J. D. Vance, and a great deal of talk about Indian and American cooperation on every kind of project. To many observers it looked as though India had switched sides: defected from BRICS and taken up a place as one of the key partners of the American and Israeli alliance. That was February. By September, the picture had changed completely. Modi, holding the rotating BRICS chair for the year, hosted the bloc's summit in New Delhi, and it was an extraordinary success. All ten full members were there, along with the partner states and a long list of guests and invitees, a heavy presence from across what is now called the Global South. The agenda moved, and real issues were discussed and resolved, many of them behind closed doors. So why did India change course so sharply, and so quickly? Brovkin, a historian of Russia who follows the bloc closely, sees two reasons.

2Why India Came Home

The first is Pakistan. Pakistan has built an alliance with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and New Delhi concluded that it was far better to come home to BRICS, with the organization on its side and a significant role in the affairs of Asia and the Global South, than to face Pakistan and its new allies alone. The second reason is Donald Trump. The American president threatened India specifically with sanctions and tariffs for buying Russian oil, and the threats did serious damage to the relationship. India had made a great deal of money on that oil. Some of it was refined and sold on to Europe, which let European governments maintain the appearance of an embargo on Russian oil while knowing perfectly well that they were still buying it, only now by way of Indian refineries. Europe, Brovkin observes drily, paid more for Russian oil through India than it would have paid buying it directly, and felt better about it; if Europeans preferred self-deception at a premium, that was their choice.

For India, though, the American threats landed on a nerve that has nothing to do with oil prices. India is acutely sensitive to questions of national sovereignty and colonialism, to being ordered about from outside, once by Great Britain and now, it seemed, by the United States. So New Delhi made it a matter of principle: nobody tells India what to do, whom to trade with and whom to avoid, and nobody punishes India with tariffs for its choices. Partly out of pride, partly out of principle, and partly because staying in BRICS pays, India took up its role as summit host in earnest. It was careful about how it did so. Modi said again and again, in speech after speech, that BRICS was not directed against the United States, and Vladimir Putin echoed him. The bloc was open to trade with everyone, the United States included; it was not an exclusive club, not an anti-Western alliance, and not a campaign against the dollar. Brovkin takes those assurances seriously, and, as the last chapter of this volume shows, he thinks they are true in a precise and limited sense. But the economic decisions of the summit, he argues, tell a larger story than the speeches did.

3Putin's Ovation and Iran's Seat

Two political details from New Delhi stand out in Brovkin's account. The first is that Vladimir Putin received a standing ovation. He was one of the stars of the summit, arguably the star, which is a remarkable position for a leader whom Western governments had spent four years trying to isolate. The second detail matters even more. Iran, a full member since 2024, sat at the center of the gathering, and agreement after agreement emphasized that American attempts to sanction any country doing business with Iran were meaningless.

This may be the first time, Brovkin suggests, that an organization rooted in Asia, with Russia alongside it, has told the United States plainly that it does not care, and that it will act in its own interest regardless of what Washington threatens. The rhetoric of the summit was conciliatory; its substance was a refusal. And the reason the refusal can be more than words, the reason a bloc of this kind can shrug at American sanctions at all, shows up not in the communiqués but in the plumbing of international payments.

4No Problem, No Problem

The Western media's reading of the summit's economic decisions was nearly universal. This was not about de-dollarization, the coverage said. It was about local trade in local currencies and about linking up central banks. Nobody was launching a new common currency, as if the bloc had ever planned to imitate the European Union and its euro. The theme running through all of it was reassurance: no problem, no problem, no problem.

Brovkin argues the opposite, and his case rests on a technical question almost none of that coverage addressed: what the new BRICS payment system actually is, and how it is built. The answer, he argues, matters far more than whether anyone in New Delhi announced a currency, because a currency is only one way to escape the dollar's reach. A payment network that no outside power can switch off is another, and it may be the more consequential of the two.

5A Hub Can Be Closed

Start with the system the BRICS network is measured against. When a bank in one country pays a bank in another, the money does not simply fly across a border. A message has to travel first, telling one bank what the other intends, and for most of the world since the 1970s that message has traveled through SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. SWIFT is, at bottom, a messaging system, founded in 1973 and headquartered in Belgium, just outside Brussels. Banks in more than two hundred countries and territories connect to it in order to reach one another, and every message passes through the same network. It is a centralized system, and that is its strength: one standard, one hub, and nearly universal reach.

It is also its vulnerability, because a hub can be closed to anyone. Iran found this out in March 2012, when its banks were disconnected from SWIFT under European Union sanctions over its nuclear program. Russia found it out in March 2022, when major Russian banks were cut off after the invasion of Ukraine. A country severed from SWIFT is not forbidden from trading, but it loses the ordinary means of getting paid, and every transaction becomes slower, costlier, and more uncertain. Countries that watched this happen to Iran and then to Russia drew an obvious conclusion: whatever their relations with the West today, they could not afford to depend on a switch that someone else controls.

6Nodes Without a Center

The core of the BRICS system, as Brovkin describes it, is called DCMS, the Decentralized Cross-Border Messaging System. It does the same job as SWIFT: it lets banks and states pay each other for anything. But it is not a copy of SWIFT. In structure, he argues, it is SWIFT's exact opposite. The key word is node. A node is a deployed instance of the messaging system, running on the cryptographic keys of a single participant. Usually that participant is a central bank, but the system works on several layers: one connects central bank to central bank; another is peer to peer, equal to equal, bank to bank or government to government; and a third is the customer layer, where a company pays another company, a bank, or a central bank. The nodes are also called gateways, because each member's national payment system keeps running in its own way. Brazil has Pix, the instant payment system its central bank launched in 2020. China has CIPS, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System it launched in 2015. Russia has SPFS, the financial messaging network its central bank built in 2014, when the first Western sanctions over Crimea raised the prospect of losing access to SWIFT. The BRICS nodes are the bridges between these national systems, linking all of them into one network without replacing any of them.

Russian postage stamp for the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, showing the Kazan Kremlin
Russia's stamp for the October 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, where, on Brovkin's account, work on the bloc's payment network was accelerated. (S. Kapranov, Marka; Wikimedia Commons, public domain.)

What makes the design remarkable, on Brovkin's account, is that nobody sits at its center. No participant controls anything but its own node, and no participant can switch off the network as a whole; all each member has is a gateway connecting it to the rest. That is why decentralization is one of the system's defining features: the nodes connect to one another, and new nodes can be added whenever another country or institution is admitted, so the network can grow without ever acquiring a hub. Its designers are proud of a second feature they call multi-sovereignty. SWIFT is governed by one organization; this network is governed by no single one, and it was built so that sanctioning or excluding a member does not work the way it does under SWIFT. A particular node can still be cut off, but the network is diverse enough that participants can keep trading with one another even after being shut out of SWIFT. The third feature is currency. SWIFT's world is tied to a few major currencies, the dollar, the euro, and sometimes the yen. The BRICS system is multicurrency: members trade peer to peer and bank to bank in their own local currencies, while algorithms calculate value and carry it from one side to the other without the dollar, euro, or yen taking part, and the arrangement, Brovkin says, is ultimately anchored to gold rather than to any national currency. The system also works with very few intermediaries and is protected by serious cryptography. From what Brovkin has read, it was designed at Saint Petersburg State University and put in place over several years, with the work accelerated at the BRICS summit Russia hosted in Kazan in October 2024.

7Sanctions-Proof

Is this BRICS payment system, then, an alternative to SWIFT? Absolutely, Brovkin answers: that is its core purpose. Each step in building it has been evolutionary, but the steps add up to a revolutionary change. It is now possible, he argues, to conduct international trade on a large scale without any recourse to SWIFT, and trade that does not pass through SWIFT is trade that sanctions cannot easily reach. His verdict is blunt. If Iran sells oil to China through this system, there is nothing the United States can do about it, and Washington would not even know the sale had taken place, because it has no access to the BRICS network, none to the national payment systems it links, and none to the nodes, which are encrypted and protected. The system is sanctions-proof, and that, he suspects, was very probably the point of it from the start.

It is not a worldwide system, and it does not pretend to be. It is still the trading network of a regional alliance. But the region is growing in strength, and measured by purchasing power the BRICS members already produce more than the G7, roughly 40 percent of world output against the G7's share of under 30. It is a growing and successful system of world trade, and its central achievement is independence: from sanctions, and from any control by the Western powers that have used the hub of the old system as an instrument of policy.

8De-dollarization, Correctly Understood

So does any of this amount to de-dollarization? The answer, Brovkin argues, is more complicated than either side of the argument usually allows. When Modi and Putin say the system is not designed to displace the dollar, they mean it, and they are telling the truth. Their aim is not to supplant the dollar, which can carry on as before. What is shrinking is the share of the world's transactions made in dollars. More and more of them pass through the BRICS network and are never denominated in dollars at all. In that sense, and only in that sense, this is de-dollarization: not an assault on the dollar but a quiet withdrawal from it, trade growing between countries that simply do not use it.

And why should they? The dollar is America's currency, and its global role, Brovkin argues, rested on a world that no longer exists. The petrodollar arrangement of the 1970s, under which Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf producers priced their oil in dollars and recycled the proceeds into American assets, suited a world in which oil flowed mainly from the Gulf to the United States and the West, and in which much of the rest of the world, still largely pre-industrial in the 1950s and 1960s, had little need for oil in any quantity. That world has changed. The societies that once sat at the edges of the dollar system have grown up, and they now trade with one another in their own currencies. When Richard Nixon's Treasury Secretary told Europe's finance ministers in 1971 that the dollar was America's currency but their problem, he was describing a world with no alternative. The Western coverage of New Delhi was right about one thing: nobody announced a new currency. What it missed is what has been built in its place, a network that belongs to no single country, answers to no single capital, and has no switch for anyone to turn off. And the most significant long-term fact about it, in Brovkin's closing judgment, is who stands at its head: China, Russia, and, once again, India.

Afterword: The Ledger

Every volume of The Theater Papers ends with its ledger, so the map can be checked against the territory. Because this volume channels one commentator's reading of a single summit, its stakes test whether his account of the BRICS payment network holds up. Three of his claims are staked here precisely enough to be checked later.

  1. The network carries real trade. Within two years, at least two BRICS central banks publicly confirm that cross-border payments between them are being settled through the bloc's decentralized messaging network rather than through SWIFT.
  2. The dollar's share keeps slipping. The United States dollar's share of the world's disclosed foreign-exchange reserves, as reported in the International Monetary Fund's COFER data, falls below 55 percent in at least one quarter before the end of 2028.
  3. India stays home. India remains a full member of BRICS through 2028 and does not join American sanctions on Russian or Iranian oil, with Russia remaining one of its two largest sources of imported crude through 2027.

And it names the events that would break the map:

  1. Three years pass without any member publicly settling trade through the network, or the project is quietly shelved: the sanctions-proof system was more announcement than infrastructure.
  2. The dollar's share of global reserves rises back above 60 percent: the claim that dollar use is steadily shrinking was wrong.
  3. India leaves BRICS or formally aligns with American sanctions on Russia or Iran: the claim that sovereignty and self-interest brought India home for good was wrong.

Whichever side of the ledger fills up first, you will know what this map was worth. That is the deal between writer and reader, and it is the whole point of writing any of it down.